Conflict prevention is a part of the cure for the current migrant crisis

Conflict and instability are central drivers of migration, so effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies – not isolationist and anti-immigration responses – are key to addressing the current migrant crisis in Europe, says Saferworld’s Brie O’Keefe.

The recent deaths of more than a thousand people while attempting to cross the Mediterranean has caused a flurry of crisis-driven policy responses by the EU and its member states. However, this latest migration crisis has not developed overnight: the last two years have seen a massive increase in the numbers of migrants seeking to make the perilous journey from North Africa to Europe, with a four-fold increase in numbers reaching Europe in 2014 compared to 2013.

The reasons for this are varied and complex, but there is clear and compelling evidence that conflict and insecurity are central drivers behind much of Europe’s current migration crisis. Migrants are transiting through Libya, a country that has suffered from violent instability since the 2011 uprising; and the majority of people seeking entry to Europe meanwhile are from Syria, Eritrea and other conflict-affected countries. Marked spikes in the numbers of migrants from contexts such as Mali, Tunisia, Palestine and Yugoslavia have also been recorded during periods of crisis in those countries. Addressing conflict must therefore be a crucial part of both immediate and longer-term UK and EU responses to the Mediterranean migrant crisis.

The scale of the challenge drives its urgency: there are more refugees today than at any other point since World War II. While the rhetoric in Europe is increasingly occupied with isolationist immigration policies, it is developing countries, and not Europe, that have taken on the overwhelming burden of hosting these refugees, potentially risking their own stability.

While UK politicians have been debating the extent to which the current situation is a result of post-conflict planning failures in Libya, this risks oversimplifying the complex drivers of the migrant crisis and placing too much emphasis on the UK’s military actions alone. This focus on post-conflict planning fails to adequately account for the role of decades of UK and European support for autocratic regimes (beyond Libya and around the world) in the name of regional ‘stability’ instead of pushing harder for an increased voice for civil society and meaningful political reform. By failing to connect historical support with the potential to fuel instability, we risk repeating these same mistakes in the process of addressing Mediterranean migration when working with allies in the region.

Recent EU commitments to revive search and rescue operations and increase funds available are vital and welcome. But if the goal is to prevent further drownings and migrant overflow, immediate UK and EU policy responses must include a comprehensive analysis of Europe’s role within current conflicts across the region and beyond, and examine how to respond to the concerns and priorities of conflict-affected people.

While special attention should be paid to key recommendations made by agencies like the UN’s High Commission for Refugees and International Organisation for Migration, there remain key opportunities for the UK and EU to develop a more holistic response. Drawing on our analysis of lessons learnt from previous conflicts and Saferworld’s work on upstream conflict prevention, the following represent avenues to be explored to ensure policymaking truly prioritises long-term conflict prevention and builds peace:

• Renew or redouble UK and European diplomatic engagement with protracted conflicts, alongside targeted dialogue with relevant governments, where present, to respond to the needs, experiences and priorities of conflict-affected people.
• Examine and interrogate the motivations and incentives of key allies in migration management initiatives. It is likely the EU and UK will be working with governments of key neighbouring states (such as Morocco, Algeria or Egypt) to develop a plan of support to address the migrant crisis. In doing so, it is vital that the EU and UK closely examine the motivations of actors involved in light of what perverse incentives may be created (such as incentivising a chronic crisis to maintain profits or potential impacts on governance, corruption or law and order). While allying with repressive or authoritarian regimes may be tempting as a short-term solution, Europe must look to encourage good governance and democratic reform wherever possible.
• Analyse all UK and EU national and international policies, including arms exports, which affect global and regional conflicts, taking a comprehensive approach. This includes evaluating to what extent aid, economic and geostrategic interests may be perpetuating current conflicts and/or enabling corrupt and repressive regimes, where conflict risks are being bottled up for the future. Additionally, the UK and other EU member states should more stringently implement their own arms exports controls, including through stronger interrogation of the risk of diversion and of fuelling conflict across the Middle East and North Africa.
• Design new maritime initiatives based on a robust and impartial analysis of migration drivers. Discussions alluding to the work of Combined Task Force 150 in addressing Somali piracy as a potential initiative to replicate in the Mediterranean fail to account for the drastically different circumstances and drivers of these two distinct situations, and fail to adequately interrogate the legacy of this initiative. False parallels should not be drawn between these two radically different sets of circumstances.

Moving forward, Europe must look to institutionalise commitments to long-term conflict prevention in its plans, policies and programmes. The Mediterranean crisis is but one symptom of a world plagued by new challenges in conflict and instability. While we must be ready to respond to conflict when it breaks out, policy-makers need to ensure that policies in support of long-term peacebuilding and upstream conflict prevention are not crowded out by day-to-day priorities, including through institutionalising these approaches at the right level and with sufficient independence. Allowing isolationist and anti-immigration concerns to drive policy responses risks lengthening the current crisis and sowing the seeds of a new wave of conflict and migration in the future.

Read more about Saferworld's work with the EU.

“Allowing isolationist and anti-immigration concerns to drive policy responses risks lengthening the current crisis and sowing the seeds of a new wave of conflict and migration in the future.”

Brie O'Keefe