Employing ‘prevention’ to prevent mass atrocities

If the United States Government were to adopt comprehensive measures to prevent conflict ‘upstream’ it might not be predicting a likely increase in the risk of worldwide mass atrocities in 2014 and beyond, says Mike Brand.

Last month the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, gave the annual Worldwide Threat Assessment briefing to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  The annual public threat assessment is a brief overview of the US intelligence community’s assessment of threats to US national security.  Since 2011, when President Obama declared the prevention of mass atrocities to be in the national interest of the United States in Presidential Study Directive 10, the annual assessment has routinely included a short paragraph on mass atrocities. 

This year’s mass atrocity paragraph was particularly interesting.  According to the intelligence community the risk of worldwide mass atrocities is likely to “increase in 2014 and beyond.”  While, “Overall international will and capability to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities will likely diminish in 2014 and beyond…”  That is a worrisome one-two punch; more incidents of mass atrocities with less international will and capability to prevent or mitigate them. 

While the short 158 word paragraph doesn’t delve into why the will to prevent or mitigate atrocities will diminish, it does touch on what the intelligence community sees as trends that drive atrocities. According to the intelligence community, social mobilization, violent conflict, cross-border instability, conflicts that exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions, low quality of governance, and impunity for past abuses, are all drivers of mass atrocities.  This is a pretty benign and broad statement that many would agree with, but it should be noted that this is not an exhaustive list.

The main issue this statement does not bring up is that the US has still not developed a comprehensive whole of government approach to prevent mass atrocities—something the President was adamant about creating— nor has United States Government (USG) policy thus far attempted to address the drivers of mass atrocities around the world.  Although steps have been made in the right direction (mainly the establishment of the Atrocities Prevention Board) there is still far too little attention being paid to true prevention.  Instead the USG habitually defers to its long-used and failed policy of acting after the fact.  While it is worth noting that the response time in the face of mass atrocities—an example of mitigation not true prevention—has marginally improved, the USG still fails to make a concerted effort to address deep-seated drivers of conflict and mass atrocities through structural upstream conflict prevention.  

Rather than reacting after a conflict turns to crisis, upstream conflict prevention aims at tackling the root causes and drivers of conflict before they lead to a violent crisis and sometimes, unfortunately, mass atrocities.  Oftentimes these crises are the symptom of long-standing tensions and fissures within societies that if left unaddressed can lead to violence.  Effectively employing upstream conflict prevention strategies requires a concerted effort between the three D’s (diplomacy, development, and defence) of US foreign policy and a focus on community security.  Working with local communities will not only help identify the root causes of conflict but also provide recommendations based on local experiences for how to best address them and tailor the response to specific community needs.

The two most recent examples where atrocities have occurred, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan, epitomize the failure of the USG to take early preventive action to minimize the chance that a fragile situation could decay into episodes of violent conflict.  In both situations the warning signs and increasing tensions did not translate into action.  Targeted preventive diplomacy would have been particularly effective in ensuring the nascent conflicts did not escalate.  The CAR’s long history of unstable governance and internal security issues could have benefited from development aid focused on governance reform and security sector reform.  Strong aid programmes aimed at ameliorating potential drivers of conflict, focused on sustainable and inclusive governance, could have been very impactful.  Given the US’s close relationship with South Sudan (a nation many key USG officials like to boast the US helped midwife into existence) preventive diplomacy and early action should have been taken at the earliest onset of warning signs. 

Waiting until a situation escalates into full conflict before decisively engaging is a recipe for failure.  At the earliest signs of power grabs, internal strife, and repression the USG should have developed a comprehensive action plan of upstream conflict prevention combining both incentives for reform and disincentives for failing to alleviate the situation.  This is especially true in South Sudan where the US had close diplomatic and donor relationships with the Government of South Sudan.  While there were some statements made about the country’s deteriorating human rights record, too little attention and effort was paid at the highest levels to have any lasting impact.  Similarly in the CAR a great deal of attention was paid to combating the nearly defunct Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) while little attention was paid to the internal dynamics and drivers of conflict in the country. 

The ongoing crises in both countries serve as a stark example of situations that would have benefited from upstream conflict prevention measures. However, the USG is still yet to employ such strategies into their toolbox for preventing violent conflict and mass atrocities.  Having focused for so long on a strict ‘hard security’ approach to dealing with conflict, the USG is inept at developing long-term structural approaches to prevent conflict.  This is evident in the USG’s strategy on combating violent extremism, terrorism, and reactions to instances of violent conflict around the world.  Whether it is Special Forces night raids, drone strikes and targeted killings, or military aid and training, the hard security mentality is very much at the forefront of US foreign policy. 

A more holistic view of security and insecurity that seeks to address the drivers of violent conflict and how to best approach these issues is necessary – as is a rebalancing of the three D’s policy and budget.  While US foreign assistance accounts for only a little over 1% of the national budget, lawmakers on the Hill consistently seek to slash aid spending.  These calls for spending cuts on foreign assistance continue even when top military officials from the Pentagon incessantly argue for increased aid and diplomacy spending.  Top military experts have made the argument time and time again that diplomacy and foreign aid should be viewed as an integral part of national security expenses and are often a cheaper and more effective endeavour than the use of military force.  Putting more resources and effort into diplomacy and development will not only help the US more effectively prevent conflict and mass atrocities ad hoc but also aid in sustainable prevention efforts writ large.

An increase in the risk of worldwide mass atrocities in 2014 and beyond is not written in stone, nor is a decrease in the international community’s will or capability to prevent atrocities.  The intelligence community’s assessment on the future of mass atrocities can be proven wrong if upstream conflict prevention measures are adopted into the USG’s strategy for preventing violent conflict and mass atrocities. The USG can lead the way towards this shift in the approach the international community takes to prevent mass atrocities.  If comprehensive preventive action is employed as a USG strategy and actually implemented, the 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment paragraph on mass atrocities could read very differently than this year’s.

Mike Brand works in Saferworld's Washington DC office.

“Waiting until a situation escalates into full conflict before decisively engaging is a recipe for failure”

Mike Brand