Pragmatic politics doesn’t mean giving up on a more hopeful future for Sudan

Sudan is entering a new phase of the war that started two years ago, on 15 April 2023. While recent military developments – in particular, the recapture of Khartoum by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) – may appear to be a turning point, the war is far from over. Indeed, to frame it as such would be an outrage to the many who are still at grave risk as the conflict intensifies across other parts of Sudan, especially the west and south, which have endured decades of atrocities and injustice.  

Beyond direct armed conflict, the violence (and resulting trauma) that has entrenched itself across the foundations of society will likely persist for generations. If – in this era of ‘pragmatic politics’ – international engagement settles for the low bar of elite bargains and disincentivising ‘men with guns’, if it is driven by self interest in geopolitical power play or Sudan’s rich natural resources, then the likelihood will be that there is a swift return to something resembling previous authoritarian regimes.  

The war in Sudan has been fought with a brutality based on existential zero-sum logic, fuelled by historic bitterness and deeply rooted resentment. This has manifested as a war against civilians, including through deliberately sadistic tactics, such as widespread sexual and gender-based violence and rape as a tool of war. Old approaches of exploiting ethnic divisions and strategic marginalisation of vulnerable groups have been accompanied by newer tactics of disinformation through social media and a new range of ‘faceless weapons’, including emerging technologies, such as drones.  

Yet, there has been something very different about this war. The consequences of decades of marginalisation and exploitation of seemingly far away regions and brutal manipulation of localised ethnic divisions to sustain elite political power have surged right back to the epicentre of Khartoum and exploded in the most dramatic and vengeful way possible. Those at the centre of elite politics – who have never had to look the consequences of their actions in the eye – have been faced with a full-frontal assault of the rage and hatred they have instrumentalised over many years. They have finally begun to understand the terror that millions have endured at their hands. 

This has also coincided with the onset of an era where international engagement and foreign policy increasingly focus on utilitarian politics at best and pure self-interest at worst. Even through those lenses, pragmatic engagement in Sudan means being realistic about what kind of influence international engagement has on the course that Sudan is set on, based on actions in these moments. An immediate ceasefire and an end to indiscriminate violence is, of course, paramount; but what may happen around and immediately after will cast the die for what kind of politics and social norms will be acceptable for decades to come. 

An approach by international actors that does not chart a new course, risks sealing the same simmering mess of kleptocracy, resentful allegiances and predatory politics in a boiling pot. This will likely spill over into future skirmishes or eventually explode into civil war once again. So, what are the ingredients that may allow alternative pathways to emerge and hopefully flourish? 

1) The diplomatic toolbox and usual approach to peacemaking has not proven itself to be well-equipped to handle the complexity of the conflict and to adapt to be more responsive to the characteristic messiness and horizontal structure of social movements. However, the will and determination to try more creative and context-specific approaches could open new pathways. In the same way that the aid sector could innovate and evolve to better support mutual aid structures and different ways of doing things, investing in ways to improve and develop new tools of global peacemaking could result in new models that set examples for other global policy and practice. Important guidance for more transformative approaches could come from: prioritising the value of informed consultation and relationship-building at local and sub-national levels; considering lessons from citizen-led dialogue and change processes; engaging in more dynamic shuttle diplomacy across different layers of conflict; tailoring  support for diverse convening spaces; scrutinising high-level peacemaking approaches for their accountability to citizens; applying historic lessons from previous technocratic approaches in Sudan; and  understanding local peace processes to nuance high-level processes and agreements. None of this is necessarily new; however, a sustained commitment to diverse peacemaking approaches and an ability to adapt to new ideas and changes in context and relationships are fundamental to a more hopeful future. 

2) The international aid system has been slow to adapt to this reality, with some exceptions. Understanding of access still tends to be framed around hard access of big traditional agencies to areas (sometimes at dubious cost), rather than the access of communities in need to relevant materials and support according to their own assessment of needs and priorities. Aid has played a significant role over many years in Sudan and is intertwined throughout its political economy – this necessitates ongoing honest analysis and mitigation of the risks of aid interventions shoring up uneven structures, exacerbating conflict and inadvertently serving malicious interests. With the scale of humanitarian needs and the destruction of basic services, it will be necessary to have a multifaceted response that includes scaled up international engagement and which critically supports and sustains essential local structures and support. Rather than prioritising and centring the former, recognising the need to vastly improve its complementarity to the latter – based on how important the locally-led response is – must lead to transformative and concrete changes in strategies and policies. 

3) Many Sudanese have clearly shown that, even during the most oppressive or violent times, their determination, creativity, perseverance of solidarity with each other, mutual support and resistance continue, as evidenced by the spirit of the 2019 peaceful revolution and other historic non-violent popular uprisings. This has also persisted through the role of the mutual aid groups and civil society organisations that have been at the forefront of the humanitarian response and which have their roots in longer-term traditions. Local traditional and religious leaders, peace committees, women and youth groups and others have sustained local peace processes and conflict prevention, which has in turn facilitated humanitarian access, sustained networks of resilience and social protection, and helped communities to resist mobilisation, hate speech and efforts at tearing apart the social fabric for military gain. However, all of this is increasingly under threat due to a combination of deliberate targeting, prolonged stress and multi-generational trauma (individually and collectively), and lack of both funding and the right kinds of support. 

It goes without saying that none of this is easy. Over the years, there have been a good number of principled, passionate and intelligent international diplomats, civil society organisations, academics, aid practitioners and activists who have sought to grapple with the question of what role they might play in supporting Sudanese civilians and civil society to forge a better path for their country and, at the very least, to try to ensure that Sudanese civilians are safe and protected. 

As the parties to the conflict have approached the war with a last ‘roll of the dice’ mentality, the international community should also channel the urgency of such last chance thinking. El Fasher is on the edge of catastrophe; local responders in Khartoum and other areas have been brutally targeted and detained; and millions are at risk of one of the worst famines in decades. With the prospect of what the next few months may bring, alongside the long-term devastation of more years of war, the onus is on all involved in international engagement to think deeply, act with determination and be in solidarity with the people of Sudan for the long haul.   

There will be some degree of increased volume over the coming days due to the ministerial conference in London hosted by the UK Foreign Secretary, as well as the two-year anniversary of the war. Yet, as these marked occasions die away or are overtaken by the next media headline, the true marker of what all of that will mean will be proven over the subsequent weeks and months.  By putting Sudanese citizens and civil society - who are deeply invested in a peaceful and democratic alternative - at the centre of strategies for international engagement, there is a better chance for a more hopeful trajectory in Sudan. 

Read Saferworld's statement in solidarity with the people of Sudan.

Read more about our work in Sudan.